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THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM:
PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE*
DOMINICK SAL VA TORE**
INTRODUCTION
TrHE world today is at a crossroads in international monetary rela-
X tions. The road taken and the reforms adopted during the next few
years will shape the twenty-first century's international monetary system
and will have a significant impact on socio-economic conditions around
the world. The choices are (a) revert back to a fixed exchange rate system
such as the Bretton Woods System; (b) adopt a truly freely flexible ex-
change rate system; (c) move toward a monetary system where interna-
tional payment adjustments will rely on macroeconomic policy
coordination among the leading industrial countries and exchange rate
management to a degree that has until now proved elusive; or (d) revise
the present international exchange rate arrangements.
Which of these diverging directions the world will take depends to a
large extent on how the leading industrial nations perceive that they can
best solve the major monetary problems that they face today. This has
certainly been the case historically. For example, the Bretton Woods
System set up after World War II was characterized by fixed exchange
rates primarily as a reaction to the unstable exchange markets of the
interwar period. Today's more flexible exchange rate system came into
existence in the early 1970s because the Bretton Woods System was too
rigid and did not provide an adequate adjustment mechanism to the large
payments imbalances of the leading nations, especially those of the
United States.' Similarly, the demand for reforms of the present interna-
tional monetary system and the outlines of the probable international
economic order of the twenty-first century can, to a large extent I believe,
be inferred from or be regarded as a response to the need to solve today's
major international economic problems. These are the huge interna-
tional trade imbalances of the leading countries, excessively volatile and
persistent disequilibria of exchange rates, and the difficulty in conducting
domestic stabilization (i.e., monetary and fiscal) policies in a world char-
* Address given by Professor Dominick Salvatore on April 21, 1994 as part of the
Fordham University School of Law Graduate Colloquium 1993-1994.
** Dominick Salvatore is Professor of Economics and Department Chairman at
Fordham University in New York. He is President of the International Trade and Fi-
nance Association and Co-Chairman of the New York Academy of Sciences. He is con-
sultant to the United Nations in New York and to the Economic Policy Institute in
Washington. Professor Salvatore is the author of over 100 scholarly articles and 31
books, including International Economics, 4th edition, the leading international text in
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1. See Dominick Salvatore, International Economics 642-50 (4th ed. 1993).
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acterized by huge and persistent international capital flows resulting
from the integration of world capital markets.
This Essay first reviews the workings of the present international mon-
etary system and the reasons for its inability to solve today's major inter-
national economic problems. It then explores the major alternative
monetary systems available and examines how they would address and
resolve these problems. Finally, and most importantly, it outlines the
main features of what the future international monetary order is likely to
be. My main theme is that while we cannot determine the details of the
future international monetary system, we can infer its main features and
broad outlines from the need to solve today's international monetary
problems and from the constraints imposed by what is politically
feasible.
I. THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
The present international monetary system has four main characteristics.
(1) A wide variety of exchange rate arrangements exist. Of the 172
members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 76 (all develop-
ing countries) have pegged or quasi-pegged exchange arrangements, 13
(including 9 of the 12 members of the European Economic Commu-
nity) have managed flexibility, and another 83 (including the U.S., Ja-
pan, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada) have full flexibility. 2
Two-thirds to four-fifths of world trade is, however, conducted under
managed or full flexibility. 3 Therefore, the present system can be re-
garded more as a flexible than a fixed-exchange rate regime.
(2) Countries have almost complete freedom of choice of exchange
rate regimes. All that the 1976 Jamaica Accords (which formally rec-
ognized prevailing exchange rate arrangements) requires is that a na-
tion's exchange rate actions not disrupt its trade partners nor the
world economy. 4
(3) Exchange rate variability has been substantial. This is true for
nominal and real, bilateral and effective, short-run and long-run ex-
change rates. The IMF estimated that exchange rate variability has
been about 5 times larger during the period of flexible exchange rate
(i.e., since 1971) than under the preceding fixed exchange rate or Bret-
ton Woods System. Exchange rate variability of 2 to 3% per day and
20-30% per year has been common under the present system. Ex-
change rate variability has been larger than originally anticipated, does
not seem to be declining over time, and is for the most part
unexpected. 5
(4) Contrary to earlier expectations, official intervention in foreign
2. See International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 8 (January
1994).
3. See International Monetary Fund, The Exchange Rate System: Lessons of the
Past and Options for the Future 3 (Occasional Paper No. 30, July 1984) [hereinafter
Lessons of the Past].
4. See Salvatore, supra note 1, at 655.
5. See Lessons of the Past, supra note 3, at 5.
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exchange markets (and therefore the need for international reserves)
has not diminished significantly under the present flexible exchange
rate system as compared with the previous fixed exchange rate system.
Nations have intervened in foreign exchange markets not only to
smooth out day-to-day movements, but also to resist trends (especially
during the 1970s and since the mid-1980s), and to keep exchange rates
within the soft implicit target zones agreed upon by the leading indus-
trial nations in 1987.6
The period of the flexible exchange rate system since 1971 has been
characterized by far greater macroeconomic instability in the leading in-
dustrial countries than during the previous fixed exchange rate or Bret-
ton Woods period. Two rounds of large oil price increases (1973-74 and
1979-80) jolted the system, which resulted in double digit inflation and
led to recessions (as nations wrought to break the inflationary spiral).
The period also saw the rapid growth of the Eurodollar market and the
liberalization of capital controls. The resulting sharp increase in interna-
tional capital flows as well as the institutional changes and adjustments
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods System in 1971, rather than
the prevailing flexible exchange rates, were the primary cause of the large
macroeconomic instability suffered by the leading industrial counties,
however. Indeed, it is now widely agreed that no fixed exchange rate
system could have survived the combination of oil shocks, portfolio
shifts, and structural and institutional changes that the world faced dur-
ing the past two decades. It must also be remembered that the present
managed exchange rate system was not established deliberately as the
result of an international agreement, but was instead forced upon the
world by default by the collapse of the Bretton Woods System because of
lack of an adequate adjustment mechanism and dollar overvaluation.'
The present international financial system does, however, face some
important shortcomings. These are the large volatility of exchange rates,
the gross and persistent misalignments of exchange rates, and the failure
to promote greater coordination of economic policies among the leading
industrial nations. There is little disagreement that exchange rates have
exhibited large volatility since the establishment of the present managed
exchange rate system. There is also no question that large exchange rate
volatility, by adding to transaction costs, has affected the volume and
pattern of international trade. These costs, however, are not very large
and are not greater than those faced by firms in many other markets, as
in the metal and agricultural sectors.' Firms engaged in international
trade also seem to have learned to deal with volatility by pursuing hedg-
ing and diversification strategies quickly and at little cost. The IMF con-
cluded that exchange rate volatility did not seem to have had a
6. See id. at 9.
7. See Salvatore, supra note 1, at 652-57.
8. See International Monetary Fund, Exchange Rate Volatility and World Trade 8-
13 (Occasional Paper No. 28, 1984).
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significantly adverse effect on international trade.9 Measures could, of
course, be devised to reduce exchange rate volatility, but the costs of
these measures might not justify the benefits resulting from them.
Gross and persistent exchange rate misalignments are potentially more
damaging to the flow of international trade and investments than exces-
sive exchange rate volatility. Misalignment refers to the departure of ex-
change rates from their long-run, competitive equilibrium levels. An
overvalued currency has the effect of an export tax and an import subsidy
on the nation and, as such, it reduces the international competitiveness of
the nation and distorts the pattern of specialization, trade, and payments.
A significant exchange rate misalignment that persists for years cannot
possibly be hedged away and can impose significant real costs on the
economy in the form of unemployment, idle capacity, bankruptcy, and
protectionist legislation.10
The most recent and notorious example of exchange rate misalignment
is the overvaluation of the U.S. dollar during the 1980s. According to the
U.S. Federal Reserve System's Board of Governors, from 1980 to its peak
in February 1985, the dollar appreciated by about 40% on a trade-
weighted basis against the currency of the ten largest industrial countries.
This appreciation resulted in the huge trade deficit of the United States
and equally large combined trade surplus of Japan and Germany. It also
resulted in increasing calls for and actual trade protectionism in the
United States. It has been estimated that the 1985 U.S. trade deficit was
$60 to $70 billion greater (about twice as large) than it would otherwise
have been had the dollar remained at its 1980 level, and that this deficit
cost about 2 million jobs in the United States.1 Despite the fact that by
the end of 1988 the international value of the dollar was slightly below its
1980-1981 level, so that all of its overvaluation had been eliminated, large
global trade imbalances remained and did not show signs of declining
rapidly. Economists have borrowed the term "hysteresis" from the field
of physics to characterize the failure of trade balances to return to their
original equilibrium once exchange rate misalignments have been
corrected.
While misaligned exchange rates can be regarded as the immediate
cause of prevailing global trade imbalances, however, they were them-
selves the result of internal structural disequilibria in the leading nations.
It is these structural disequilibria and not exchange rate misalignments
that were and are the fundamental cause of the global imbalances facing
the leading industrial countries today. What could possibly be blamed
9. See id. at 16-22.
10. Cf. Salvatore, supra note 1, at 659-63 (discussing problems with present exchange
rate arrangements).
11. Cf Andrew Crockett & Morris Goldstein, International Monetary Fund,
Strengthening the International Monetary System: Exchange Rates, Surveillance, and
Objective Indicators 1-6 (Occasional Paper No. 50, 1987) (considering large and persis.
tent misalignments of real exchange rates).
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on the current international financial system is its failure to provide
smoother and more timely adjustment to such large and persistent global
imbalances as the trade and budget deficits of the United States, the trade
surpluses of Japan and Germany, and the large and persistent unemploy-
ment in Europe (including Germany) and Canada. It seems that trade
flows now respond with longer than usual lags (ranging up to two years)
to exchange rate changes (for reasons examined in the next section).
More serious is the charge that the present international financial sys-
tem failed to promote greater coordination of macroeconomic policies,
especially fiscal policies, among the leading industrial countries. To a
large extent this is due to the very different inflation-unemployment trade
off in the United States, France, United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada on
the one hand, and in Germany and Japan on the other. Policy coordina-
tion under the present system has taken place only occasionally and has
been very limited in scope. One such episode was in 1978 when Germany
agreed to serve as a "locomotive" to stimulate growth in the world econ-
omy. Another episode of limited policy coordination was the Plaza
Agreement of September 1985, under which the G-5 countries (United
States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, and France) intervened in
foreign exchange markets to induce a gradual depreciation or soft land-
ing of the dollar in order to eliminate its large overvaluation. A related
example of successful but limited coordination of policies is the Louvre
Accord of February 1987, which established soft reference ranges or tar-
get zones for the dollar-yen and dollar-mark exchange rates. Despite
these examples, a great deal of dissatisfaction with the operation of the
present international monetary system remains, and there are widespread
calls for reforms.12
II. PRICE AND INCOME ELASTICITIES, AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES
According to international economic theory, a depreciation of a coun-
try's currency will improve its trade balance by stimulating the nation's
exports and discouraging imports if the sum of the price elasticities of the
foreign demand for the nations's export (nx) and the price elasticity of
the nation's demand for imports (n1,) exceeds the absolute value of one.
This is known as the Marshall-Lerner condition.1 3 Even if such a condi-
tion is satisfied, so that a devaluation or depreciation of the deficit coun-
try's currency does improve its trade balance, such a policy would not be
feasible if the Marshall-Lerner condition is barely satisfied. The reason is
12. See Salvatore, supra note 1, at 627-28; see generally Foreign Exchange Issues,
Capital Markets, and International Banking in the 1990s (Dominick Salvatore & Khos-
row Fatemi eds., 1993); Handbook of Monetary Policies in Developed Countries (Domi-
nick Salvatore & Michele Fratianni eds., 1993); Handbook of Open Economies
Macroeconomics (Dominick Salvatore et al. eds., 1994); Handbook of National Eco-
nomic Policies (Dominick Salvatore ed., 1992)Protectionism and World Welfare (Domi-
nick Salvatore ed., 1993).
13. See Salvatore, supra note 1, at 465.
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that the adjustment to the trade deficit will then be rather slow and a
large devaluation or depreciation may be required, and this is
inflationary.
During the past four decades a large number of empirical studies have
been undertaken to measure price elasticities in international trade. In
general, they have found that the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied
(so that the foreign exchange market is stable) but it is only barely satis-
fied.4 This means that the adjustment to the trade balance that can be
expected within one year of a devaluation or depreciation is minimal.
Answering the question of why this is the case offers the reasons for the
slow adjustment to the trade imbalance resulting by the sharp deprecia-
tion of the dollar and equally large appreciations of the Japanese Yen and
German mark since February 1985.
An important reason for the low price elasticities in international trade
and small adjustment to the trade imbalances is due to the lags from
exchange rate changes to price changes, from price changes to changes in
purchases, and from the latter to actual shipments and data recordings.
It has been estimated that because of these three lags it normally takes
from twelve to eighteen months for the trade balance to respond to
changes in exchange rates. With the U.S. dollar starting to depreciate in
February 1985, no improvements to the U.S. trade balance were to be
expected before the fall of 1986 or early 1987. In fact, there is now evi-
dence that the real trade balance of the United States started to improve
during the last quarter of 1986 and the nominal trade balance began to
improve only during the last quarter of 1987.15
The second reason for the long delay in the response to exchange rate
changes is that for a while the increase in the price of imports over-
whelms the reduction in the quantity of imports, so that the domestic-
currency value of imports actually increases before it falls (the so-called
J-curve effect). In the recent U.S. experience, the continuing or ratchet-
ing depreciation of the dollar from 1985 to 1988 meant that just as the
effect of a particular round of depreciation was about to be reflected in an
improvement in the U.S. trade balance, another round of depreciation
took place (with its original increase in the dollar value of U.S. imports)
which prevented the improvement from the original round of deprecia-
tion from showing its effect. This is sometimes referred to as rolling-J-
curve or "cascading" effect. 16
Eventually, however, the final cumulative effects of these recurring
rounds of dollar depreciations began to show through in 1988 and 1989
with substantial, though long-delayed reductions in the U.S. trade deficit
with respect to most nations of the world, except Japan. The third rea-
son for the slow response of the U.S. trade balance to exchange rate
14. See id.
15. See Paul R. Krugman, Has the Adjustment Process Worked? 13-20 (1991).
16. See id. at 33-44.
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changes is due to the fact that foreign firms, having struggled to success-
fully establish and increase their market share in the U.S., have been very
reluctant to give it up when the dollar started to depreciate, and they
have been willing to absorb most of the price increase resulting from the
dollar depreciation out of their profits. In the jargon of the profession,
the "passthrough" effect from dollar depreciation to increase in the dol-
lar price of U.S. imports has been small. It is only with the latest round
of dollar depreciation that we are beginning to see substantial increase in
the dollar price of imports to the United States. For example, even
though the dollar depreciated by over 40% between 1985 and 1988, the
increase in the dollar price of Japanese imports to the United States was
less 20%, and most of this increase took place only during 1987 and
1988.17 It is now likely that any further dollar depreciation will be fully
reflected in increases in the dollar'price of U.S. imports, and this is likely
to reinforce the adjustment process that is only recently taking effect.
Finally, it took time for U.S. and foreign firms producing tradeable
commodities to be convinced that the early depreciation of the dollar
would continue and not be reversed. Because it is very costly to plan and
build or dismantle production facilities and enter or leave new markets,
firms have acted with longer than usual response lags to exchange rate
changes. In fact, many U.S. firms have increased capacity utilization
without adding much new capacity during the past two years. " There is
also the difficulty of re-entering a market and re-introducing a product
line after they have been abandoned for several years and after the indus-
trial base of the nation has eroded significantly. Once a market is lost, it
is usually very difficult to recapture it.
III. ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEMS
We now briefly examine the various international monetary systems in
order to determine the one that would best be suited to deal with the
international financial problems faced by the world economy today. The
systems examined are as follows: the gold standard, a fixed exchange sys-
tem without gold, a freely flexible exchange rate system, target zones,
systems based on close international policy coordination, and others.
The presentation will necessarily be brief and will be directed to identify-
ing the most important characteristic of each system as well as its main
advantages and disadvantages.
The Gold Standard. The gold standard operated from 1880 to 1914.
Under it, a balance of payment deficit was to be automatically corrected
by an outflow of gold from the deficit nation, a reduction in its money
supply, and a decline in prices, which would stimulate exports and dis-
courage imports. The opposite would occur in the surplus nation. The
process would continue until trade balances were in equilibrium. This is
17. See iL at 13-20.
18. See id. at 33-44.
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the Hume's celebrated price-specie-flow mechanism. To achieve external
balance the nation thus has to give up control over its money supply.
The overall growth of the money supply for all the nations is limited by
the amount of newly mined gold. This imparts a price or noninflationary
discipline to the system. Only very few economists and politicians advo-
cate going back to the gold standard, and there is practically no chance
for its reestablishment today. The reason is that no nation wants to give
up control over its money supply and be unable to use monetary policy to
achieve such important internal objectives as full employment without
inflation, together with an adequate rate of growth.19
A fixed exchange rate system without gold. Under such a system, a
nation would define the par value (exchange rate) of its currency and the
allowed band of fluctuation about the par value, and stand ready to buy
or sell its currency on the foreign exchange market (by drawing down or
accumulating its reserves of other currencies) in order to prevent the ex-
change rate from moving outside the allowed band of fluctuation. A
trade deficit would be financed by a loss of international reserves, while a
trade surplus would be settled by an increase in the nations's interna-
tional reserves. Under such a system, a nation with a balance of pay-
ments deficit would have to reduce its money supply (or increase it at a
slower rate than the surplus nation) so that prices would fall in the deficit
nation relative to the surplus nation until trade imbalances are corrected.
As in the case of the gold standard, however, the nation would have to
give up control over its money supply and the use of monetary policy to
achieve its domestic goals. Such a system could be inflationary (with
little or no effect on trade balances) if all nations increased their money
supply at about the same rate. The Bretton Woods System (the system
that operated from the end of World War II to 1971) was a hybrid system
or a gold-exchange standard, whereby the United States fixed the price of
the dollar in terms of gold and all the other nations then fixed the value
of their currency in terms of the dollar. The system collapsed because
the United States was unwilling to abide by rules of the system and give
up control over its money supply.20 This serious shortcoming also mili-
tates against the reestablishment of a fixed exchange rate system today.
Freely flexible exchange rate system. With a freely flexible exchange
rate system, exchange rates are determined by the unrestricted operation
of the market forces of demand and supply for foreign exchange. This
would, for the most part, insulate a nation from economic disturbances
arising abroad and allow the nation to use monetary policy (i.e., to
change its money supply) to pursue domestic goals. Each nation would
thus be able to choose its desired inflation-unemployment trade off with-
out much regard for balance of payments considerations. A balance of
payments deficit would be corrected automatically by a depreciation of
19. For a general discussion of the gold standard, see Salvatore, supra note 1, at 639-
41.
20. See generally id. at 642-56 (discussing the Bretton Woods system).
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the nation's currency, while a surplus would be corrected by an apprecia-
tion of the nation's currency. The disadvantage of such a system is that
in a world of highly integrated capital markets and huge and rapid inter-
national capital flows in response to even minor changes in economic
variables and "news", exchange rates are likely to be very volatile, to be
subject to over-shooting, and to possibly drift away from equilibrium by
substantial amounts and for long periods of time. This seriously distorts
the pattern for international specialization and trade. Freed from the
obligation to maintain fixed exchange rates, central banks might also em-
bark on inflationary policies so that the monetary discipline (the so-called
"anchor" argument) of a fixed exchange rate system would be lost. Be-
cause of these serious shortcomings, there is not much support and there
is little chance that a truly freely flexible exchange rate system would be
established today.21
Target zones. Target zones are an attempt to have a system that incor-
porates the advantages of both a fixed and a flexible exchange rate system
while avoiding the shortcomings of either. Under such a system, the
leading industrial nations estimate the equilibrium exchange rate and
agree on the range of allowed fluctuation. John Williamson suggested a
band of allowed fluctuation of 10% above and below the equilibrium ex-
change rate or par value.22 The exchange rate is determined by the
forces of demand and supply within the allowed band of fluctuation (thus
taking advantage of this important trade equilibrating mechanism) and
prevented from moving outside the target zones by official intervention in
foreign exchange markets (thus avoiding the worse excesses of overshoot-
ing and misalignments of a flexible exchange rate system). The target
zones would be soft, however, and would be changed when the underly-
ing equilibrium exchange rate moves outside or near the boundaries of
the target zone. Though not made explicit, the leading industrial nations
seemed to have agreed upon some such "soft" target of "reference zones"
for the exchange rate between the dollar and the yen and between the
dollar and the German mark since the Louvre Accord of February 1987.
The sliding boundaries of these target zones were much smaller than the
10% advocated by Williamson, however. Critics of target zones believe
that target zones embody not the best but the worst characteristics of
fixed and flexible exchange rate systems.23 As in the case of flexible rates,
target zones allow substantial fluctuation and volatility in exchange rates
and can be inflationary. As in the case of fixed exchange rates, target
zones can only be defended by official interventions in foreign exchange
markets and thus reduce the monetary autonomy of the nation. In re-
sponse to this criticism, supporters of target zones, such as Williamson,
21. See Salvatore, supra note I, at 659-63.
22. See generally Marcus H. Miller & John Williamson, The International Monetary
System: An Analysis of Alternative Regimes 1033 (1987).
23. See Martin S. Feldstein, Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government:
Thinking About International Economic Coordination, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 1-13 (1988).
19941 1983
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
have extended their blueprint to require substantial policy coordination
on the part of the leading industrial nations so as to reduce the need for
intervention in foreign exchange markets to keep exchange rates within
the target zones.24 Many economists, however, point out that extensive
policy coordination among the leading countries is not feasible under
present conditions.25
International monetary systems based on policy coordination. There are
several international monetary systems based on extensive policy coordi-
nation among the leading countries. One system crucially dependent on
policy coordination is the one proposed by Ronald McKinnon.26 Under
this system, the United States, Japan, and Germany (the three major in-
dustrial countries) would fix the exchange rate among their currencies
and then closely coordinate their monetary policies to maintain fixed ex-
change rates. A tendency for the dollar to depreciate vis-a-vis the yen
would signal that the United States should reduce the growth rate of its
money supply, while Japan should increase it. The net overall increase in
the money supply of these three countries would then be at a rate consis-
tent with the non-inflationary expansion of the world economy.
Another proposal introduced by the IMF Interim Committee in 1986,
which was discussed at the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotia-
tion (1974-1977) and supported by U.S. Treasury Secretary Baker in
1988 is for the development of commodity indexes (including gold) to
signal the type of coordinated macro-policies for nations to follow under
the supervision of the Fund in order to keep exchange rates stable at their
equilibrium level over time.27 A rise or fall in the index in a nation
would signal the need for restrictive or expansionary policies for the na-
tion. Stability of the index for the world as a whole would be the anchor
for noninflationary world expansion.
This type of close macroeconomic policy coordination is virtually im-
possible under present conditions. For example, during the past few
years, the United States has been unwilling or unable to reduce its huge
budget deficit substantially and rapidly; Germany has been unwilling to
stimulate its economy even though it faces an unemployment rate of
more than eight percent of its labor force; and Japan has been very reluc-
tant to dismantle its protectionistic policies to allow much more imports
from the United States so as to help correct the huge trade imbalance
between the two nations. As long as these nations have very different
inflation-unemployment trade offs, effective and substantial
macroeconomic policy coordination is practically impossible. Indeed,
24. See Miller & Williamson, supra note 22, at 1031-48.
25. See Feldstein, supra note 23, at 1-13.
26. See Ronald I. McKinnon, Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies for International
Financial Stability: A Proposal, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 83-103 (1988).
27. See generally Morris Goldstein et al., International Monetary Fund, Policy Issues
in the Evolving International Monetary System 28-32 (Occasional Paper No. 96, 1992)
(discussing the strengthening of multilateral surveillance and policy coordination).
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these nations consider the ability to choose different inflation-unemploy-
ment trade offs to be an important advantage of the present international
monetary system.
It was sometimes asserted that the European Monetary System (EMS)
provided evidence that significant macroeconomic policy coordination
was possible.2" After the recent (1992-1993) monetary crisis and collapse
of exchange rate arrangements in Europe, however, no one suggests this
any longer. Even before the recent monetary crisis in Europe, however,
critics had pointed out that macroeconomic policy coordination was
more feasible in Europe than for the world as whole because of the
greater homogeneity of the major European countries than among the G-
7 countries (the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and Can-
ada) and the willingness of the European countries to accept the domi-
nant position of Germany. Furthermore, empirical research by Frankel
and Rockett has shown that nations gain from international policy coor-
dination only about half of the time and that the welfare gains from coor-
dination, when they occur, are very small.
Other international monetary systems. There is another class of inter-
national monetary systems which consider the huge international capital
flows in today's highly integrated international capital markets as the pri-
mary cause of the exchange rate instability and global imbalances af-
flicting the world economy today. They are, therefore, based on
restricting international speculative capital flows. James Tobin would do
this with a transaction tax which becomes progressively higher the
shorter the duration of the transaction in order "to throw some sand in
the wheels of our excessively efficient international money markets."2 9
Dornbusch and Frankel would instead reduce financial capital flows in-
ternationally with dual exchange rates-a less flexible one for trade
transactions, and a more flexible one for purely financial transactions not
related to international trade and investments.30 By restricting interna-
tional "hot" money flows by capital market segmentation or the
decoupling of asset markets, Tobin and Dornbusch believe that the inter-
national financial system can be made to operate much more smoothly
and without any need for close policy coordination by the leading indus-
trial countries-which they regard as neither feasible nor useful. 31 Crit-
ics of these proposals, however, correctly point out that it is next to
impossible to separate "nonproductive" or speculative capital flows from
"productive" ones related to international trade and investments: 2 We
might add that capital is fungible so that evasion of such a transaction
28. See Salvatore, supra note 1, at 617-19.
29. James Tobin, A Proposal for International Monetary Reform, 1978 E. Econ. J.
153, 154.
30. See Rudiger Dornbusch & Jeffrey Frankel, The Flexible Exchange Rate System:
Experience and Alternatives 46-50 (NBER Working Paper No. 2464, 1987).
31. See Tobin, supra note 29, at 153-59; Dornbusch & Frankel, supra note 30, at 46-
50.
32. See Feldstein, supra note 23, at 1-13.
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tax or more volatile exchange rate would greatly limit the effectiveness of
these efforts.
Finally, there is Cooper's utopian single world currency proposal.
33
With a single currency, of course, there would be no balance of payments
or exchange rates problems. But nations would have no control over
their money supply and be unable to conduct any type of national eco-
nomic or stabilization policy. In short, having a single world currency, as
advocated by Cooper, would be like "throwing away the baby with the
bath water."
IV. THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM
The broad outlines of the international monetary system of the future
can be inferred from the need to solve the serious financial problems
faced by the leading industrial countries today in the face of the political
and economic constraints that they face. What seems certain is that in a
world of huge international capital flows such as we have today, no fixed
exchange rate system could probably survive without extensive controls
on international capital flows. Furthermore, nations seem unwilling to
give up control over their money supply and to be unable to use mone-
tary policies to achieve domestic goals. I think that the history of the
past two decades has made this quite clear.
At the same time, the leading industrial nations believe that exchange
rates have been far too volatile and have overshot by substantial degrees
and for long periods of time their equilibrium rate (e.g., the U.S. dollar in
the mid 1980s). Excessive volatility and gross misalignments can be
overcome by the establishment target zones with soft boundaries. As
long as the equilibrium exchange rate is estimated to remain near the
center of the target zone, the target zone can be defended with monetary
policies and policy coordination. Target zones would be changed if the
equilibrium exchange rate moves outside or close to the limits of the pre-
vailing target zone. While it may be difficult to agree on what the exact
equilibrium exchange rate is, the events since 1985 indicate that it is pos-
sible for the leading industrial nations to reach a general agreement on a
narrow range within which the equilibrium exchange rate among the
world's leading currencies should be. The criticism that the leading in-
dustrial nations must either give up control over their money supply or
agree to an impossible high degree of policy coordination in order to keep
exchange rates with an appropriate target zone, can be answered by say-
ing that each nation will intervene in foreign exchange markets, adjust its
money supply, and respond to calls for policy coordination based on its
circumstances, the domestic targets that it sets for itself, and the relative
importance of these domestic targets.
One thing is clear, balance of payments (as any type of adjustment) is
painful. Rather than using only one method of adjustment (such as
33. See Richard N. Cooper, A Monetary System For the Future, Foreign Aff. (1987).
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changes in exchange rates, changes in the money supply, or fiscal and
other policy changes) each nation will allow all of the mechanisms of
adjustment to operate in various degrees to suit its own specific prefer-
ences. Thus, a large nation facing a large external disturbance (such as
Japan and Germany facing huge trade surpluses) will want to place a
greater share of the adjustment burden on exchange rate changes rather
than on other adjustment policies; another large nation facing a large
internal imbalance (such as the United States facing huge budget deficits
in the 1980s), while allowing some adjustment to the resulting trade im-
balance to take place through a depreciation of its currency, would place
more of the burden of adjustment on domestic policies. In the case of the
United States, this would require cutting the budget deficit.
In this connection, it must be pointed out that external pressure on a
country to put its house in order, while certainly not binding, is not en-
tirely irrelevant or ineffective and may reinforce domestic pressures to
undertake more forceful domestic action to correct the problem than
otherwise. To some extent, this has certainly been true in the case of the
United States since 1987 with regard to its budget deficit. Thus, we
could say that we already have some degree of implicit international pol-
icy coordination. Smaller and more specialized economies may also opt
for smaller exchange rate flexibility and greater reliance on internal ex-
penditure-changing policies than larger open economies to achieve bal-
ance of payments adjustment and is likely to lead to the formation of
currency blocks. In fact, we begin to see today the formation of three
currency blocks: the dollar, the yen, and the EMS currency with more
flexible rates among than within each block, in parallel to the evolution
of the same three major international trading blocks.
Rather than a shortcoming, a system of fluctuating exchange rates
within wide and soft target zones, by providing the freedom for each
nation to determine how much it will rely on the various mechanisms of
adjustment, is a crucial advantage of the international financial system
being proposed. The broad outline of such a system is already in place
today and, while its operation can certainly be strengthened by striving
for regular consultations and for as much policy coordination as is feasi-
ble under various circumstances among the leading nations, I believe that
no other system would be able to better deal with today's international
monetary problems. Excessive exchange rate volatility and misalign-
ments can be addressed to a large extent by working with target zones.
Different inflation-unemployment trade offs can be reconciled, at least to
some extent, by regular consultation and by whatever policy coordina-
tion is possible. The inherent inflationary tendency built into the system
by the flexibility of exchange rates within the target zones can similarly
be curbed, at least to some extent, by consultation and limited policy
coordination. This is not as unrealistic as might be thought on purely
theoretical grounds. After all, the sharp world-wide inflationary tenden-
cies of the 1970s have been brought under control by the leading nations
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within the framework of the present international financial system and in
the absence of a great deal of policy coordination.
Bluntly, much greater policy coordination would not be possible with-
out each nation at the same time having to give up its own unique set of
domestic targets. But by the actions and pronouncements of their lead-
ers, the leading industrial countries have clearly indicated that they value
very highly such freedom and flexibility-limited as it is in today's highly
interdependent world. Besides, separation of powers between the execu-
tive and legislative branches of government in the United States practi-
cally precludes any greater degree of international policy coordination.
Furthermore, the leading industrial nations have shown that they can
control the worse inflationary excesses that can arise under a flexible ex-
change rate system with the limited degree of policy coordination that
has been possible. In the final analysis, most of the global imbalances
faced by the leading industrial nations today are rooted in the huge and
persistent budget deficits of the United States, lack of more internal stim-
ulus in Europe in general and Germany in particular, and the unwilling-
ness on the part of Japan to rely more on the expansion of internal
demand for growth than on exports to the United States, and cannot be
blamed on the operation of the present international financial system it-
self. Automaticity would have forced the United States to eliminate its
budget deficit quickly, but this would have imposed an identical inflation-
unemployment trade off on most nations. Most of the flexibility and dis-
cretion that nations enjoy under the present and proposed systems would
be lost. Nations simply cannot have it both ways. They cannot impose
automaticity on themselves and at the same time retain the freedom and
discretion to choose the unique set of domestic targets that they prefer.34
34. See Tobin, supra note 29, at 153-59.
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